INTRODUCTION
At their core, legal conflicts often involve disputes over power, money, respect, or any combination thereof. 1 The State of Maine has a complicated and often adversarial legal relationship with the federally recognized Native American Tribes (Tribes) in the State. 2 Perhaps the most contentious legal lawsuit forced the EPA to take action on the WQS for Indian lands, but in the end, Maine did not like the results. 16 After weighing its options, on October 8, 2015, Maine filed an amended complaint to its July 2014 suit against the EPA-claiming that the 2015 disapprovals for WQS on Indian lands were unlawful. 17 While this Note does not predict the outcome of Maine's suit against the EPA, the complexity of the legal issues sheds light on why the collective federal, Tribal, and state interests would be better served by an out-of-court settlement.
This Note analyzes the policy considerations, legal framework, and lost opportunities illuminated by the EPA's decision to disapprove WQS on Indian lands in Maine. Part I considers the federal interests in the dispute and provides an analysis of the EPA's rationale for the decisions, including its trust responsibility and authority under the CWA. 18 Part II considers the Tribes' interest by analyzing the history of the Tribes' agreements with Maine and the Tribes' rights under Maine and federal law in the context of the EPA's decision. Part III analyzes Maine's primary legal arguments against the EPA's decision and highlights why Maine's interests are likely better served by working cooperatively with the EPA and Tribes. Finally, Part IV recommends how Maine and the Tribes can build mutual trust and attempt to resolve future conflicts outside of the courts. Given the incessant conflicts over Tribal water rights under the current framework, Part IV provides a suggestion for how Maine and the Tribes can do more to encourage compromise-rather than waste valuable resources in the war over water quality.
A. Water Quality Regulation in Maine and EPA's Decisions
The CWA requires that any individual or entity discharging pollutants from a point source into waters of the United States must obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 19 NPDES permits work to protect and maintain water quality by obtain their own separate delegated authority to administer pollution discharge permitting under the CWA. Id.; see also Susan Sharon, Maine Sues EPA Over Water Quality Assessments on Tribal Lands, ME. PUB. (July 8, 2014), http://news.mpbn.net/post/maine-sues-epa-over-water-quality-assessmentstribal-lands (discussing Maine's decision to file suit against the EPA).
16. See DEP'S POSITION, supra note 9, at 1, 3. 18. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the lost opportunities for Maine to limit federal intrusion by failing to address the EPA's and Tribes' concerns).
19. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2012) (provision of the CWA permitting states to adopt their own WQS subject to EPA approval).
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Balancing the Fishes' Scales 857 limiting the volume of pollutants; since 1972, they have been responsible for "significant improvements" in the quality of the Nation's water bodies. 20 The CWA allows states to apply for EPA authorization to administer the NPDES program within their borders, subject to EPA oversight, if the state intends to enforce effluent standards that meet, or exceed the EPA's standards. 21 The EPA approved Maine's application to administer the NPDES program in 2003, but explicitly withheld Maine's jurisdiction to regulate Tribal discharges on Indian lands. 22 The decision led to litigation culminating in the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Maine v. Johnson in 2007 . 23 In that decision, the First Circuit ultimately acknowledged Maine's authority to regulate surface water discharge permits under the NPDES program-including discharges by the Tribes on Indian lands. 24 Because the CWA also gives states the authority to establish and maintain WQS for surface waters within their borders, Maine felt that Johnson bolstered its position vis-à-vis the Tribes. 25 However, even after Johnson, the EPA remained reticent to take action on the WQS on Indian lands. 26 According to the EPA's 2015 letters, it delayed addressing the WQS on Indian lands even after Johnson because Maine's authority remained unclear. 27 This murkiness flowed from the "unique statutory framework" governing the relationship between Maine and the four federally recognized Indian Tribes in Maine: the Penobscot Nation, the Passamaquoddy Tribe, the Houlton Band of Maliseet, and the Aroostook Band of Micmacs. 28 This framework includes both state and federal acts codifying agreements 24. See id. at 46-47 (finding that the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters on Tribal lands was outside the "internal affairs exemption" of the Settlement Acts).
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2) (2012); Letter from Janet T. Mills, Attorney Gen., Me., to Gina McCarthy, Adm'r., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & Loretta Lynch, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Ex. A 1-2 (June 12, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/60_day_noi_ from_state_of_maine_re_3_epa_actions_on_maine_wqs.pdf.
26. February, 2015 Letter, supra note 7, at 2. 27. EPA's Analysis, supra note 12, at 9. 28. Letter from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Avi S. Garbow, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wq/ruledev/ wac173201A/comments/0060qq.pdf [hereinafter DOI Letter].
858
Vermont Law Review [Vol. 41:853 between Maine and the Tribes, collectively known as the "Settlement Acts." 29 The Settlement Acts defined and enhanced the Tribes' land base and subjected the Tribes to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of Maine, except for "internal Tribal matters." 30 As the First Circuit found in Johnson, administering NPDES permits and "environmental regulations" are not "internal Tribal matters." 31 This holding is unique to Maine, however, because under long-recognized principles of federal Indian law, states generally do not have civil regulatory authority (including the authority to regulate the environment) in Indian country, unless expressly authorized by Congress. 32 Following a January 30, 2015, opinion letter from the Department of the Interior (DOI), the EPA felt that it had enough information to rule on Maine's authority to set WQS on Indian lands. 33 The EPA ultimately found Johnson controlling and conceded that "the unique jurisdictional formula" gave Maine the authority to set WQS on Indian lands.
34
Even though the EPA clarified Maine's authority to set WQS on Indian lands, the EPA concluded that Maine's authority is not absolute.
35
The EPA remains charged with reviewing all WQS promulgated by states and can object to any standards or designated uses that it feels do not meet the requirements of the CWA. 36 If a state fails to address the EPA's objection to the standards, the EPA can take over and promulgate standards that it deems appropriate.
37 This is the route that the EPA took in its 2015 disapproval of Maine's human health standards for waters on Indian lands. 38 The EPA found that the Settlement Acts explicitly acknowledge 
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Balancing the Fishes' Scales 859 sustenance-fishing rights for the Tribes in Maine. 39 Because the Settlement Acts explicitly set aside land for the Tribes to "continue their unique culture," which "include[s] sustenance fishing," Maine's WQS must protect such rights. 40 Acting as trustee for the Tribes, the EPA read Maine's designated use of "fishing" on Indian lands to mean "sustenance fishing." 41 As such, the EPA concluded that Maine did not account for an adequate fish-consumption rate when determining its human health criteria for waters on Indian lands. 42 Essentially, the EPA claimed that the WQS could not support fish populations healthy enough for the Tribes to consume safely within their sustenance fishing rights. 43 Understandably, the Tribes in Maine applauded the EPA's decisions.
44

B. Maine's Response
Not surprisingly, given the jurisdictional issues implicated by the EPA's decision, Maine responded much differently than the Tribes. On March 17, 2015, and June 12, 2015, Maine's Attorney General, Janet Mills, sent the EPA a notice of intent to sue over the disapprovals. 45 The notice of intent letters described Maine's position that the EPA's disapprovals were unlawful.
46 Janet Mills followed up on October 8, 2015, when she filed an amended complaint to Maine's 2014 action against the EPA, reiterating the claims from the 2015 notice of intent letters. 47 Maine's legal arguments relate to the EPA's interpretation of the Settlement Acts and the EPA's application of a new "sustenance fishing" designated use for waters in Indian lands. 48 The long list of Maine's legal claims revolves around the EPA's creation of a designated "sustenance fishing" use for waters in Indian lands, and how this designation contravenes the Settlement Acts. 50 Maine contends that the EPA's decision creates a two-tiered regulatory system, elevating the goals of Maine's federally recognized Tribes over the rest of Maine's population. 51 Maine argues that the EPA's creation of an entirely new designated use of "sustenance fishing" in Maine waters, without a public notice-and-comment process, violates the CWA and Administrative Procedure Act. 52 Maine's overarching arguments are that the EPA improperly interprets the Settlement Acts and that the EPA's unilateral creation of the "Tribal sustenance fishing" designation "usurps Maine's role as a 'State' under the Clean Water Act."
53
From a policy perspective, Maine claims that the EPA's proposed heightened standards to protect Tribal sustenance fishing rights will have a regulatory reach well beyond the waters in Indian lands. 54 For example, numerous entities, including industries and municipalities, are currently regulated under the NPDES program for discharges into the Penobscot River system alone. 55 The Penobscot Nation's reservation consists of islands in the Penobscot River. 56 The EPA's decisions suggest that the permit requirements for multiple regulated entities on the Penobscot, and other regulated entities discharging into different state waters near Indian lands, will need to change to comply with the stricter human health criteria. 57 Additionally, Maine argues that since the EPA failed to define the precise boundaries of "waters in Indian lands," the decisions drastically disrupt longstanding regulatory expectations in Maine's water quality classification system. 
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C. Constant Tensions
The current dispute over WQS for Indian lands illustrates the strong tensions between Maine and the Tribes over the scope and application of the Settlement Acts. Since the first enactment, Maine and the Tribes have repeatedly litigated the meaning of the Acts. 59 The frequency and aggressive nature of these lawsuits strained the relationship between the Tribes and Maine. 60 The relationship has become so spiteful that in April 2015, Maine Governor Paul LePage rescinded a 2011 Executive Order directing state agencies to establish policies recognizing the sovereignty of the Tribes. 61 In response, Tribal representatives in the Maine Legislature for the Penobscot Nation, Passamaquoddy, and Aroostook Band of Micmacs abandoned their seats in the Legislature and issued a statement saying that they no longer recognized Maine's authority to interfere with Tribal "selfgoverning rights," such as fishing for sustenance. 62 inextricably linked to the Tribes' history, culture, and identity. 66 As such, the Tribes view Maine's claims of unbridled regulatory control over these waters not only as an attempt to limit Tribal power, but also as showing a lack of understanding and respect for Tribal culture and customs. 67 On the other side, Maine contends that the Settlement Acts clearly prevent the "two-tiered" regulatory structure for land and water resources that the Tribes are calling for. 68 Maine believes that the Tribes are attempting to circumvent the Settlement Acts, by going behind Maine's back and secretly communicating with the EPA and other federal agencies. 69 For instance, even though the Settlement Acts subject the Tribes to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of Maine, beginning in the late 1990s, the Penobscot Nation began requesting that the EPA grant the Tribe "treatment as a State" (TAS) status under § 518 of the CWA. 70 TAS status would permit the Penobscot Nation to administer their own NPDES program and set WQS wholly separate from Maine's WQS. 71 However, Congress clarified that because of Maine's regulatory jurisdiction, established by the Settlement Acts, the TAS provision does not apply in Maine. 72 Actions like those of the Penobscot Nation led Maine to lose trust in the Tribes' motives. Maine sees the Tribes' secret communications with federal agencies as a means to get more than what the Tribes bargained for under the Settlement Acts.
73
The divergent viewpoints of Maine and the Tribes provide an important lens through which to view the WQS dispute. It is unlikely that anyone involved in negotiating the Settlement Acts, on behalf of the Tribes or Maine, anticipated the incessant litigation involving the meaning of the Acts. 74 In fact, the Settlement Acts created the Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission (Commission) as an advisory body to help with the implementation of the Settlement Acts. 75 The Commission serves as an intergovernmental organization directed to:
[C]ontinually review the effectiveness of this Act and the social, economic and legal relationship between the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation and the State and shall make such reports and recommendations to the Legislature, the Houlton Band of Maliseet Indians, the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation as it determines appropriate.
76
The Commission has the important task of evaluating the effectiveness of the Settlement Acts.
77 However, the Settlement Acts limit the scope of the Commission's authority in respect to these relationships to "reports and recommendations" to the Legislature and Tribes. 78 As such, the Settlement Acts, as currently written, do not provide a mechanism for fostering a strong relationship between the Tribes and Maine. 79 These differing views in how the Settlement Acts apply to water resource regulation ultimately left the door open for the federal government to step in and assert its own interests in protecting water quality on Indian lands in Maine.
I. STEPPING IN: EPA'S RATIONALE FOR THE DISAPPROVALS
A. The Federal Trust Responsibility
The EPA based its decision to disapprove Maine's WQS for waters on Indian lands in large part on the federal government's trust responsibility to tribes. 80 The federal government's trust responsibility to Indian tribes flows from the common law doctrine first articulated in Cherokee Nation v. State maine-dissected-by-scholars-during-panel-at-umaine/ (discussing the disappointment of Reuben Butch Phillips, a representative for the Penobscot Nation during negotiations for the Settlement Acts, who said, "[a]lmost every single day since 1980, I regret not pressing some of the issues that we are now fighting").
75. ME. STAT. tit. 30, § 6212 (1) of Georgia in 1831. 81 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall stated that a tribe's "relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian"; the tribes look up to the government for protection and rely upon its oversight and power. 82 Because the guardian and ward model was based on 19th century notions derived from colonialist policies, courts modified it over time into a trust relationship in which tribes are the "beneficiary and the United States the trustee." 83 The Supreme Court characterized this relationship as an affirmative fiduciary duty, duty of protection, and moral obligation-akin to that of a trustee to a beneficiary-with the same attendant responsibilities. 84 The trust relationship can develop through formal exchanges between tribes and the federal government, such as treaties, executive orders, agreements, and statutes. 85 Federal courts have given the United States considerable flexibility in applying the trust doctrine to protect tribal resources. 86 Moreover, because of its common law roots, the government requirement to apply the trust responsibility is sometimes unclear-especially with regard to environmental protection. 87 In such cases, unless a clear statutory fiduciary duty exists, courts are unlikely to compel the federal government to act on the trust responsibility to protect tribal interests. 88 Federal agencies appear free to choose to act on the trust responsibility when they find the trust relationship implicit in a statute or regulation. 86. Goodman, supra note 81, at 301. 87. See Barnum, supra note 2, at 1195 (explaining the complex relationship of the federal government to tribes in the environmental protection context because the government "must play multiple roles, acting as regulator and decision-maker as well as trustee").
88. See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 295-96 (2009) (explaining the requirement of a "specific rights-creating or duty-imposing" statute or regulation in order to hold the federal government liable under the trust responsibility for money damages).
89. Barnum, supra note 2, at 1197-98.
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The first acceptance of a federal trust relationship with Maine's Tribes did not occur until the 1970s. 90 Before that time, the federal government viewed the Trade and Intercourse Act, which required Congressional ratification of agreements with tribes, as inapplicable to tribes in the original 13 colonies. 91 However, the Maine Tribes successfully proved this belief wrong in 1975 in Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton. 92 The ruling in Morton essentially required the federal government to acknowledge that it has a trust responsibility to Maine's Tribes. 93 Pursuant to the EPA's relationship with the Tribes, the four Tribes are federally recognized; they have their own sovereign governments that the EPA works with on a regular basis, and the EPA consults with the Tribes when making particular decisions that could impact tribal interests. 94 Additionally, in 2014, the DOI reaffirmed the trust responsibility to tribes by explaining that federal agencies should work with tribes to "the maximum extent possible in a manner that accommodates and protects trust and restricted fee lands, trust resources, and treaty and similarly recognized rights." 95 The Settlement Acts provide the framework through which federal agencies can work with the federally recognized Tribes in Maine. 96 As part of the Settlement Acts, the Tribes ceded much of their civil and criminal 91. Barnum, supra note 2, at 1165 n.30. 92. Morton, 528 F.2d at 380. 93. DOI Letter, supra note 28, at 10-11. 94. EPA's Analysis, supra note 12, at 13. Maine contends that the statutory provisions in the Settlement Acts revoked the federal government's trust responsibly with the Tribes. Id. However, the EPA rejects this argument. See id. (explaining that the Settlement Acts impact the jurisdictional framework through which the EPA works to address the Tribes' interests, but does not extinguish the EPA's ability to address those interests through the trust responsibility).
95 97 Maine argues that because the Tribes abrogated their rights to the State, the federal government's trust responsibility cannot extend to civil matters, such as defining WQS. 98 The Tribes did give up a considerable amount of their jurisdictional authority through the Settlement Acts, but what they gained in return was federal recognition and land. 99 Therefore, the Settlement Acts clearly established a federal trust relationship for the Tribes and for the Tribes' land. 100 The Tribal lands are critical to the EPA's position, because the Indian lands at issue are held in trust by the federal government. 101 From the federal government's perspective, federal agencies, such as the EPA, have a fiduciary obligation to protect these resources.
102 Accordingly, when the EPA considered the approval of WQS on Indian lands, the agency acted on its fiduciary duty and considered the implications of those standards on the Tribes' trust resources. 103 Uncovering which resources are held in trust, and why those resources were set aside for the Tribes, guided the EPA's ultimate decision to disapprove Maine's WQS on Indian lands. 104 The EPA ultimately found that the Settlement Acts confer authority on Maine to set WQS on Indian lands. 105 However, the EPA also found that the Settlement Acts codified the Tribes' right to fish for sustenance, which the EPA should consider when fulfilling its duties under the CWA. 106 Therefore, the scope of the EPA's trust responsibility to the Maine Tribes must fall within the statutory contours of the Settlement Acts and the CWA. Understanding the legal scope of the EPA's decisions requires an analysis of the EPA's authority under the CWA to disapprove WQS, as well as an analysis of why the EPA disapproved Maine's human health criteria standards. 
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B. EPA's Authority to Disapprove Water Quality Standards
Under the CWA, unless otherwise revoked, all states are responsible for "reviewing, establishing, and revising water quality standards." 107 WQS consist of: (1) the water's designated uses, such as public water supply, recreation, and propagation of fish; (2) the specific "criteria" specifying, in either numerical or narrative form, the amounts of various pollutants that can be in the water before impairing designated uses; and (3) antidegradation provisions that protect existing uses and limit degradation of high-quality waters. 108 The designated use defines the particular goals for a water body and the criteria work to protect that use. 109 At the very least, the specific water quality criteria for any water body must be sufficient to protect the water body's designated use(s). 110 States must adopt standards that will ultimately "protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of the Act."
111 Unless a state can show otherwise, all WQS must, at a bare minimum, set criteria that will allow a water body to be both fishable and swimmable. 112 When a state revises an existing WQS or proposes a new WQS, the state must submit it to the EPA Administrator for approval. 113 The Administrator then has the affirmative duty to consider whether the criteria proposed by the state are protective of the designated uses for the water body, and whether the standards protect the public health or welfare and serve the purposes of the CWA. 114 According to the EPA's regulations, when it reviews state WQS for approval or disapproval, the review involves, among other considerations: first, a determination of whether the state adopted designated uses consistent with the requirements of the CWA; 110. 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a)(2). 111. § 131.3(i). To serve the purposes of the Act, a state's WQS must provide water quality that will protect the propagation of "fish, shellfish, and wildlife" and provide for "recreation in and on the water" where attainable. WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK, supra note 109, at 1. See also 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(j) (establishing that states must conduct an attainability analysis if the state sets a WQS that will not provide for waters to be fishable or swimmable).
112. and second, whether the state adopted criteria that protect the designated uses based on sound scientific rationale. 115 If the EPA determines that the standards adopted by the state are consistent with these requirements, then it will approve the WQS. 116 However, if the EPA finds the standards are not consistent with the above requirements, then the EPA can take over and promulgate new or revised standards consistent with the CWA. 117 As such, the CWA and the EPA's own regulations demonstrate that the ultimate determination of whether standards are sufficient for a particular water body resides with EPA.
118
C. EPA's Disapproval of Maine's Human Health Criteria on Indian Lands
The Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) develops and proposes new and revised WQS for Maine's waters. 119 Between 2003 and 2014, the Maine DEP periodically submitted new or revised WQS to the EPA for review. 120 As discussed above, the EPA failed to affirmatively address Maine's proposed standards on waters in Indian lands during that time. 121 In response to the EPA's inaction, Maine requested that the EPA approve the WQS for all of the State's waters in 2013, including those on Indian lands, and then filed suit against the EPA in 2014. 122 The EPA's delay was due, in part, to uncertainty regarding Maine's jurisdiction to set WQS in the Tribes' lands. 123 The EPA concluded that the Settlement Acts did provide Maine sufficient jurisdiction to set WQS in Indian lands. 
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In a practical sense, when evaluating new or revised WQS, the EPA undertakes a two-step process.
126 First, the EPA reviews and may act on proposed designated uses.
127 Then, if the EPA approves the designated uses, the EPA considers whether the proposed water quality criteria are adequate to protect the specific designated uses. 128 In this case, the EPA first reviewed and approved Maine's proposed surface water classifications and corresponding designated uses for all waters on Indian lands. 129 All of these classifications have one important feature in common: "fishing" constitutes a designated use in each. 130 The EPA harmonized the Settlement Acts and the CWA to interpret the "fishing" designated use to mean, "sustenance fishing" for the waters on Indian lands. 131 The EPA failed to cite any case law, statute, or regulation directly authorizing it to "read in" a designated use set by a state.
132
After interpreting the sustenance fishing use for the waters on Indian lands, the EPA proceeded to determine whether Maine's proposed water quality criteria were sufficiently protective.
133 WQS protect against the effects of toxic pollutants on humans through the adoption of numerical human health criteria. 134 Because toxins suspended in the water will accumulate in fish, when considering a designated use of "fishing," states must extrapolate numeric human health criteria using applicable human fish consumption rates. 135 The rate reflects the grams of fish per day that a human consumes. From the fish consumption rate, the state calculates the relative health risks to fish consumers, such as the relative cancer risk, based on set numeric criteria for toxic pollutants. States do have flexibility in choosing which populations the criteria are designed to protect. 137 States can base the fish consumption rate on the "general population of fish consumers" to apply a statewide fish consumption rate, or the state can base its criteria on specific geographic regions with smaller high-consumption subpopulations. 138 This flexibility permits states to make scientifically informed risk management decisions regarding its population. 139 In the WQS Maine submitted to the EPA, Maine chose to focus the fish consumption rate on the statewide population, and used 32.4 grams per day, with an associated cancer risk level of one in one million. 140 Maine considered the Tribes a highly consuming subpopulation and determined that, even though the Tribes consume more fish, the statewide rate of 32.4 grams per day minimized the cancer risk level to Tribal populations to no greater than 1 in 10,000.
141
The EPA concluded that the Settlement Acts determine how the EPA and Maine must analyze the potential effects that the toxic pollutants have on the Tribal population in the Tribes' lands. 142 Considering this difference in protection, and acting on its federal trust responsibility to the Tribes, the EPA concluded that it would be inconsistent with the Settlement Acts to treat Tribal members as a subpopulation for waters on Indian lands.
143
Based on a peer-reviewed study, the EPA concluded that the Maine Tribes historically consumed between 286 to 514 grams of fish from Maine waters per day. 144 In this context, the EPA disapproved Maine's human health criteria for waters on Indian lands-the criteria were not based on "sound 
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Balancing the Fishes' Scales 871 scientific rationale" and ultimately not protective of the designated use of sustenance fishing in the Tribes' waters. 145 Understanding the legal support for the EPA's disapprovals requires an analysis of the Tribes' rights to fish for sustenance reflected in the Settlement Acts.
II. HOLDING ON: HOW THE TRIBES RETAINED SUSTENANCE FISHING RIGHTS
A. The Settlement Acts
Since long before Europeans arrived, fishing for sustenance on ancestral lands was an essential part of the Penobscot Nation, Passamaquoddy, Aroostook Band of Micmac, and Houlton Band of Maliseet's livelihood and cultural heritage. 146 The intervening centuries following colonization contained numerous land transactions and other lesscivilized means of disenfranchising the Tribes of nearly all of their lands.
147
In the 1970s, the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe attempted to regain much of their ancestral lands through legal suits claiming a right to "between five and eight million acres" in Maine. 148 As discussed below, the Settlement Acts resolved these land claims starting in 1979, and by 1991 all four Tribes were federally recognized with a land base deliberately set aside to preserve the Tribes' sovereignty and culture. 149 The Settlement Acts essentially occurred in two waves. First, the Maine legislature passed the Maine Implementing Act (MIA) in 1979 to settle the land claims of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy-which Congress ratified in the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act (MICSA) in 1980.
150 These two Acts primarily dealt with the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe, setting aside both reservation and trust land, but also 145. Id. 146. See Gousse, supra note 66, at 536 (explaining that, according to creation legends in all of these Tribes, "the First People lived along the mighty Penobscot River and drew life from its cold, pristine waters, irrigating their crops, harvesting fish, and sustaining their health by the grace of its bounty") (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 536 n.1.
PAUL BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF THE MASHPEE, PASSAMAQUODDY, AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND 99 (1985).
149. See Gousse, supra note 66, at 538 (elaborating that the "compromise" made in the Settlement Acts extinguished full Tribal sovereignty and limited the Tribes to a limited "quasisovereign, quasi-municipal status"). 154 These different Acts treat sustenance practices differently-depending first on the specific Tribe, and second on whether the land is reserved or held in trust. 155 Regardless of the type of land, the Acts' language, Congressional intent, and the federal reserved rights doctrine support the EPA's argument that the Tribes retained a right to carry on cultural traditions and fish for sustenance.
156
B. Finding Fishing: The Purpose of the Indian Lands
Of the four Tribes, the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe are the only two with reservation lands. 157 These two Tribes also hold "explicit sustenance fishing rights." 158 The language in the MIA, ratified by Congress in the MICSA, states:
Sustenance fishing within the Indian reservations. Notwithstanding any rule or regulation promulgated by the commission or any other law of the State, the members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation may take fish, within the boundaries of their respective Indian reservations, for their individual sustenance subject to the limitations of subsection 6. 159 The limitation discussed in § 6207 (4) 
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Balancing the Fishes' Scales 873 has never done. 160 Importantly, the plain language of § 6207(4) reserves the right of the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe to fish for sustenance on their reservation lands. 161 This language supports the EPA's finding that Tribal members should be the "target population" for Maine's human health criteria on the reservation lands. 162 For example, in Atkins v. Penobscot Nation, the First Circuit interpreted the MIA and the MICSA as forcing courts to only consider Tribal interests when assessing the use of natural resources within the Penobscot Nation's reservation lands. 163 In the current case, the natural resources in question are the quality of water and the health of fish, which the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot Nation Tribal members have a clear statutory right to enjoy for sustenance. 164 As such, it appears reasonable for the EPA to conclude that these Tribes warrant the "target population" designation for regulations concerning water resources on their reservation lands.
The language Congress used to provide sustenance fishing rights in federal trust lands is not as clear as the language found in MIA § 6207(4). Given this ambiguity, it is important to analyze the federal Indian law background, which shapes Maine's and Congress's trust land legislation. 165 The reserved rights doctrine is particularly informative in this context. 166 When congressional grants of lands to federal tribes are ambiguous on the topic of water rights, the reserved rights doctrine implicitly grants the tribes reserved rights in water. 167 To determine the scope of the reserved rights, courts generally look to Congress's underlying purpose for setting aside the 160. See id. § 6207(6) (explaining the scope of the limitation in § 6207(4) and placing the burden of proof on the State to prove that the practices are harming fish stocks outside the reservation lands).
161. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) (explaining that the plain language should be used, because when the "resolution of a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear").
162. 168 The rights set aside for a tribe will "exist to the extent that the waters are necessary to fulfill the primary purposes of the reservation." 169 Prior to the passage of the Settlement Acts, in 1968 the Supreme Court looked to legislative history to find that lands ceded to the Menominee Tribe authorized the Tribe to maintain their culture through a "way of life which included hunting and fishing."
170 Under the MICSA, the purpose of the land acquisition fund for the Penobscot Nation, Passamaquoddy, and Maliseets was to "acquire land or natural resources" for the Tribes. 171 The MICSA defines "land or natural resources" to include "water and water rights, and hunting and fishing rights."
172 While the language in the MICSA § 1722(b) vests the water rights, the legislative history for the MICSA clarifies congressional intent in allocating sustenance fishing rights to the Tribes. 173 Senate reports pertaining to the MICSA acknowledge that these three Tribes "are riverine in their land-ownership orientation."
174 These reports clarify Congress's intent to ensure that the Tribes have land to maintain their sovereignty and cultural integrity. 175 As a riverine people, an essential component of the Tribes' culture was-and remains-fishing for sustenance in their waters. 176 As such, congressional intent in setting aside the lands included an implicit right to fish for sustenance.
The Aroostook Band of Micmacs did not obtain trust lands until the early 1990s through the ABMSA and the MSA. 177 Congress found that the Micmacs should obtain the same settlement that the Maliseets gained from the MICSA. 178 Senate reports for the ABMSA also displayed congressional intent to provide for a "subsistence base" for the Micmacs, while acknowledging the Tribe's "undaunted collective will toward cultural survival."
179 Such evidence of congressional intent under the reserved rights doctrine supports a finding that the Micmacs, just like the Maliseets, received an implicit reserved right to fish for sustenance on their trust lands. 
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Regarding the trust lands, under the MIA and the MICSA, both the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy appear to have more clearly established sustenance fishing rights than the Maliseets, as well as the Micmacs under ABMSA. 180 Senate reports further explain that the Tribes "have the permanent right to control hunting and fishing not only within their reservations, but insofar as hunting and fishing in certain ponds is concerned, in the newly-acquired Indian territory as well."
181 These "certain ponds" pertain to those smaller than ten acres in size. 182 Additionally, the MIA codifies the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy's rights to engage in sustenance fishing in larger ponds, as well as streams and rivers, in or alongside the trust lands.
183 Specifically, the MIA created and entrusted the Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission with the exclusive authority to establish fishing regulations in such waters. 184 When the Commission promulgates regulations for these waters, it must consider the needs of the Tribes to "establish fishery practices for the sustenance of the [T]ribes or to contribute to the economic independence of the [T]ribes . . . ." 185 The congressional intent to allow the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Tribe nearly exclusive control over fishing in their trust lands further supports the need to consider these populations as the "target" when calculating human health criteria.
The reservation lands for the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy clearly provide the right to fish for sustenance. 186 The language and legislative history of the MICSA also suggest that the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy retained the right to fish for sustenance on their trust lands. 187 Additionally, both the Maliseets and Micmacs obtained reserved rights in water with the purpose of protecting their culture through a right to fish for sustenance.
188
Taken together, the language, congressional intent, and the reserved rights doctrine support the EPA's finding that both the reservation and trust lands 180 189 The Settlement Acts collectively support the EPA's assertion that on Indian lands, Maine must consider the Tribes as the "target population" because of their sustenance fishing rights.
III. LOSING POWER: WHY MAINE SHOULD CONSIDER A COMPROMISE
Maine's response to sue the EPA over the disapprovals is not surprising given the power and jurisdiction at stake in this dispute.
190
Maine's relationship with the Indian Tribes in the State is both novel and nationally unique. 191 The level of authority Maine has over the Tribes, including the regulation of natural resources, is markedly different from almost anywhere else in the United States.
192 Maine argues that the Settlement Acts intentionally avoided the type of "two-tiered" system-or a nation within a state-that represents the relationship between federally recognized tribes and other states. 193 Because of Maine's current power, it is understandable why Maine contends that the EPA's finding of a sustenance fishing use for Indian lands creates a "special status or rights with respect to water or fish quality" not envisioned by the Settlement Acts. 
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A. Distinguishing Maine v. Johnson
Maine's legal claims against the EPA rely substantially on the holding in Maine v. Johnson. 195 As discussed above, Maine believes that the First Circuit's holding in Johnson clarified its near plenary power to regulate natural resources on the trust and reservation lands of the Tribes. 196 The issue in Johnson was whether Maine had authority under the Settlement Acts to regulate NPDES permits for two facilities wholly within the reservation lands of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy. 197 Upon delegating authority to Maine under the NPDES program, the EPA withheld permitting jurisdiction for both Tribal discharges within reservation lands. 198 Maine challenged the EPA's decision to withhold jurisdiction and the Tribes challenged the EPA's grant of jurisdiction to 19 non-Tribal facilities that drained into the Tribes' lands. 199 The First Circuit ultimately held that Maine had regulatory authority over the 19 non-Tribal facilities, as well as the two Tribal facilities, because the regulation of discharges did not fall within the "internal Tribal matters" exemption provided for in the Settlement Acts. 200 Alternatively, the central issues in this case-the Tribes' right to fish for sustenance and the EPA's authority under the federal trust doctrine-were not explicitly addressed in the Johnson case. 201 First, in Johnson, the entire case revolved around regulatory jurisdiction and the "internal Tribal matters" exemption under the MIA.
202
The Tribal right at issue in Johnson was the right to regulate discharges, or more broadly, Tribal sovereignty relating to internal regulation and selfgovernance. 203 Nothing in the EPA's 2015 decision to disapprove Maine's human health criteria on Indian lands suggests that the EPA based its decision on the "internal Tribal matters" exemption. 204 In the current case, the Tribes' rights at issue pertain to sustenance fishing-rights which were not addressed in Johnson. Even though Johnson interprets the Settlement Acts' provisions in Maine's favor, the provisions addressing sustenance fishing do not provide Maine unbridled regulatory authority over these practices.
205
The Johnson court explicitly declined to consider whether the provision of the MIA granted a right to the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy to take fish for sustenance. 206 Johnson did note that the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy are subject to the laws of Maine "with very limited exceptions"; however, the grant of sustenance fishing rights pursuant to § 6207(4) of the MIA is one of those exceptions.
207 Section 6207(4) explicitly states: "Notwithstanding . . . any other law of the State, the members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe and the Penobscot Nation may take fish, within the boundaries of their respective Indian reservations, for their individual sustenance . . . ." 208 The powerful language in the MIA pertaining to sustenance fishing rights suggests that Maine's reliance on Johnson, in this case, is not as powerful when the issue pertains to sustenance fishing.
Second, in Johnson, the First Circuit refused to consider one of the issues raised by this case: whether the EPA can act on its trust responsibility to the Maine Tribes under the CWA. 209 When discussing the EPA's argument that it has no federal trust responsibility to protect the Tribes' rights to fish for sustenance, the First Circuit called the issue "quite different" than the presently litigated issue. 210 Because the EPA had yet to rule on any state-issued NPDES permits on that ground, the First Circuit found that the issue was not ripe for review. 211 Critical to the current case, the Johnson court stated: "If Maine is wise in its exercise of its new 204 . See EPA's Analysis, supra note 12, at 10-11, 17-27 (discussing the provisions of the Settlement Acts pertaining to sustenance fishing that the EPA relied on in its decision, which do not rely at all on the provisions dealing with "internal Tribal matters").
205. See ME. STAT. tit. 30, § 6207(4) (2016) (including language granting the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe the right to fish for sustenance on their reservation lands).
206. See Johnson, 498 F.3d at 47-48 (explaining that the issue of whether the EPA could reject NPDES permits based on the trust responsibility and the Tribes' sustenance fishing rights was not addressed by the court: "[i]n all events, we take no view today as to the ultimate resolution of these potential issues").
207. 
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212
Since the Johnson decision in 2007, Maine's alleged failure to take the Tribes' concerns to heart-and exercise its regulatory jurisdiction wiselypushed the EPA to act on its trust responsibility and disapprove the human health criteria on Indian lands. The EPA's authority under the federal trust doctrine to disapprove WQS on Indian lands is a central issue in this analysis. 213 As discussed in Part I, federal courts provide government agencies considerable flexibility in applying the federal trust doctrine to protect tribal rights. 214 Courts interpret the federal trust doctrine as imposing a fiduciary duty concerning "any Federal government action" relating to Indian tribes. 215 The EPA's disapproval of WQS constitutes a federal government "action."
216 Further, the trust responsibility extends to the protection of rights reserved in agreements with Indian tribes that Congress ratified. 217 As the Supreme Court held in Antoine v. Washington, when considering whether a fiduciary duty to protect a right exists, the proper inquiry is whether the tribe "acquired federally guaranteed rights by congressional ratification of [an] Agreement."
218 In this case, at the very least, Congress guaranteed rights to the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe to fish for sustenance on their reservation lands. 219 As such, for at least two important issues required to resolve this case, the Johnson decision provides little support to Maine's assertion that the EPA acted unlawfully. 221 In Penobscot Nation v. Mills, Maine argued that § 6207(4) granted members of the Penobscot Nation sustenance fishing rights only if they fished with "one foot on the island."
222 Because the water is not part of the reservation, Maine argued, the Nation did not have a right to fish for sustenance under the MIA unless members fished from the shores of their island reservations. 223 The court rejected this interpretation as inconsistent with the legislative intent of the MIA. 224 The court stated that it "cannot allow the State to sidestep interpretation of section 6207(4)" and that the court needed to "clarify the scope of the sustenance fishing right guaranteed under MIA."
225 Even though the court found that the reservation lands only included the islands themselves, it interpreted the Penobscot Nation's sustenance fishing right to exist for the entire 60-mile stretch of the Main Stem of the River from Indian Island north to Millinocket. 226 Because of the inherent conflict in granting a right to the Penobscot Nation in waters outside of its reservation lands, the court found § 6207(4) ambiguous. 227 Ultimately, the court found that the legislature intended to protect the Penobscot Nation's sustenance fishing rights for the entire Main Stem, and stated that the court "cannot adopt an interpretation of section 6207(4) that diminishes or extinguishes the Penobscot Nation's retained right to sustenance fish . . . . 
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Balancing the Fishes' Scales 881 fishing rights in the Settlement Acts dictate that the Tribes should be the target population when Maine establishes human health criteria for waters on Indian lands. 229 As such, the holding in Penobscot Nation v. Mills dilutes Maine's arguments to the contrary, and Maine should be more willing to find an out-of-court compromise.
C. Deference to the EPA's Actions
A full court battle becomes even less appealing for Maine when considering the deference that the EPA receives from courts when reviewing WQS. The EPA is the primary agency administering the CWA. 230 Courts will not disrupt agency decisions based on highly scientific technical regulations, unless there is no rational basis for the agency's decision. 231 As such, the EPA's action on its mandatory duty to either approve or disapprove WQS is subject to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 232 In such cases, the EPA's determination receives considerable deference.
233
In El Dorado Chemical Co. v. EPA, the Eighth Circuit dealt with one of the primary arguments Maine makes against the EPA in this case: that the EPA usurped a state's role in setting WQS. 234 At issue in El Dorado was whether the EPA violated the CWA when disapproving Arkansas' WQS. 235 The EPA concluded that the proposed criteria were not protective of downstream-designated uses, and disapproved the newly proposed standards. 236 There was debate about whether the CWA and the EPA's governing regulations permitted the EPA to consider downstreamdesignated uses. 237 The Eighth Circuit ultimately found that the CWA itself supported the EPA's broad considerations when acting on new or revised WQS-finding that, " [t] 238 In this case, the EPA interpreted ambiguities in the CWA and found that sound scientific rationale requires Maine to treat Tribal populations on Indian lands as the target population for their waters. 239 In doing so, the EPA engaged in a reasonable interpretation of its authority and acted to ensure that the human health criteria protect the Tribes' health.
Importantly, the Supreme Court recently held: "It is well established that an agency's interpretation need not be the only possible reading of a regulation-or even the best one-to prevail." 240 According to the APA, an agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if:
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
241
In this case, Maine claims that Congress did not intend the EPA to consider the Tribes' right to fish for sustenance under the Settlement Acts when reviewing Maine's human health criteria. 242 However, as discussed above, the federal trust responsibility compelled the EPA to consider the Tribes' rights on their own lands, especially the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy on their reservation lands. In addition, the DOI is the federal agency charged with administering and interpreting the Settlement Acts, and clearly found the federal trust relationship counsels protection of Tribal fishing rights in Maine. 243 In the DOI's January 2015 letter to the EPA, it affirmed that the Tribes' fishing rights under the Settlement Acts are "well-founded" and clean water is essential to permit the Tribes to carry on their traditions and culture. 244 For instance, the Penobscot Nation's ability to take fish near or on their reservation is essentially nullified 242. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 17, at 9 (inferring that absent a congressional mandate to the contrary, the EPA may not consider special circumstances pertaining to Tribal rights).
243. See Gousse, supra note 66, at 550 (naming the DOI as the agency responsible for administering the Settlement Acts in Maine); DOI Letter, supra note 28, at 1 (responding to the EPA's request for guidance in interpreting the Settlement Acts with respect to tribal fishing rights and WQSs).
244. DOI Letter, supra note 28, at 11.
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Balancing the Fishes' Scales 883 because of dioxin from paper mills, fish consumption advisories, and a nearly complete wipeout of the Tribal fishery. 245 These findings suggest that "an important aspect of the problem" that the EPA needed to consider was the Tribes' ability to safely eat fish for sustenance. 246 The CWA's "broad purpose" justifies the deference the EPA receives in its interpretation. 247 As such, Maine's arguments against the EPA's action under the CWA lose considerable weight in light of the deference received by the EPA.
IV. DIRIGO: BUILDING TRUST, RESPECT, AND MOVING FORWARD
Maine's state motto is "dirigo," which is Latin for: "I lead" or "I direct." 248 In many respects, the tensions between the Tribes and the State exist because there is a lack of clear leadership-and clear direction-for how Maine and the Tribes can coexist under the Settlement Acts. The Tribes mistrust Maine's exercise of regulatory power through the Settlement Acts. Over time, Maine lost trust in the Tribes' motives, because of actions such as "undisclosed" consultations with the EPA on water quality issues. 249 For any meaningful long-term solution to flow from this current conflict, Maine should seriously consider the potential consequences posed by continuing to neglect the Tribes' sustenance fishing rights on their lands. Regardless of the outcome in this case, the broader fight over Tribal water rights in Maine will continue unless leaders from both Maine and the Tribes emerge and work toward a compromise. 250 In the EPA's proceeding in Washington, the EPA made clear that it prefers for the State to take cooperative action and adopt protective human health criteriarather than having the criteria imposed on the State by the EPA. 251 The EPA's firm policy toward protecting sustenance fishing rights was clear from the Washington proceeding, where it stated: "Where a population exercising such uses has a legal right to do so, the criteria protecting such uses must be consistent with such right."
A. Consequences Without Compromise
252
Maine was on notice that its inaction could lead to the EPA promulgating WQS in Maine-an outcome that would further frustrate the State's concerns over federal intrusion into its regulatory jurisdiction. 253 Unfortunately, for Maine-and regulated entities discharging into Maine's waters-the State's failure to address the EPA's and the Tribes' WQS concerns, pushed the EPA to take the same approach as in Washington. 254 The fear of further federal intrusion became a reality for Maine in December 2016, when the EPA promulgated rules setting final WQS for waters on Indian lands protecting the Tribes' health and their sustenance fishing rights. 255 Instead of pursuing a battle in court, Maine could have learned from the EPA's disapprovals and sought a compromise that limited the EPA's intrusion into its relationship with the Tribes. In the future, Maine can protect its interests in limiting federal intrusion on its regulatory jurisdiction if it works more collaboratively with the Tribes, and directly addresses the Tribes' concerns. 
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B. Empowering a Leader and Ending the War Over Water Quality
Maine's relationship with the Tribes is unique, but conflicts between federally recognized tribes and state governments over water are by no means unique to the State. 256 The currents running through all state-tribal conflicts often include a lack of respect, trust, and communication. 257 Across the United States, many state legislatures do not fully understand the cultural and governmental status of Indian tribes, while many tribal leaders and members mistrust the states because of historical dealings. 258 Such a dynamic is unhealthy for all parties involved. 259 As seen in Maine, these tensions often lead to each side getting locked into its particular positionmaking a court battle appear inevitable. 260 However, the opportunity to avoid litigation abounds if mechanisms exist to allow the parties to "look to their substantive interests" to communicate and build trust, "rather than simply asserting traditional positions."
261
Maine and the Tribes can address the mutual lack of respect, trust, and communication highlighted by this current conflict through a more structured and forthright dialogue surrounding the critical issues of Tribal culture and rights under the Settlement Acts. 262 Maine currently has a body in place that-with a clearer objective and greater authority-could provide a forum for this dialogue and emerge as a leader in these conflicts: the Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission. 263 As discussed above, the Commission consists of both Tribal and State representatives; serves to review the effectiveness of the Settlement Acts; and promulgates fishing [Vol. 41:853 rules for certain ponds, rivers, and streams adjoining Indian lands. 264 While the Commission does what it can with the resources that the State sets aside, the budget is small, and the Commission has no real power other than promulgating fishing regulations and publishing reports. 265 The limited role that the MIA sets up for the Commission does not permit the Commission to adequately educate government officials and Tribal members about the difficult issues on both sides. 266 The perceived failure to take the Commission's and Tribes' concerns seriously, especially surrounding sustenance fishing rights, opened the door for the EPA to step in and act on its trust responsibility to the Tribes. One way of limiting federal intrusion into Maine's relationship with its Tribes would be to bolster the Commission's role in Maine and use it to foster a "true dialogue" on these important issues. 267 The Commission could serve as a forum for both State officials and Tribal leaders to discuss and work out these issues. 268 Providing the Commission with more authority could help educate both sides on the complex issues at play, and hopefully lead to more reasoned and effective resolution of the conflicts outside of court.
Elevating the status of the Commission could occur through a narrow amendment to the MIA under § 6212(3) expanding the "responsibilities" of the Commission. 269 The new responsibilities could include requirements that the State and Tribal governments consult directly with the Commission and establish the Commission as a neutral facilitator for Tribal-State issues under the Settlement Acts. Resolving tribal-state issues is often hindered, as it was in this case, through a lack of attention, leadership, and real commitment to compromise. 270 Maine's current fish consumption rate, based on a statewide target population, is less protective of the Tribes' 267. See Friederichs, supra note 59, at 520 (explaining that resolving the underlying issues in state-tribal relations requires a "true dialogue" between the state and the tribe).
268. See NAT'L CONFERENCE. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 256, at 6-7 (identifying some of the benefits of mechanisms that increase communication).
269. ME. STAT. tit. 30, § 6212(3) (2016). 270. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 256, at 7 (stating that tribalstate relationships succeed when there is commitment to cooperation and compromise).
hydropower companies" and state and federal agencies, to restore sea-run fish to the Penobscot River watershed. 288 While the focus of the project is removing dams to restore access to habitat, the viability of the fish species, particularly the Atlantic salmon, depends in large part on the quality of the water in the river. 289 There have been tremendous improvements in the water quality of the Penobscot River over the last 30 years, but the fish are still unsafe to eat in quantities to which the Tribes are entitled. 290 Collaborating with the Tribes on protecting water quality on Indian lands will naturally lead to greater protections for the water quality of the Penobscot River. Over time, if a river like the Penobscot can be restored, it could lead to increased tourism and benefits to local citizens, businesses, and recreational and commercial fishermen.
291
CONCLUSION
The continuous tensions between Maine and the Tribes over water quality compelled the EPA to invoke its trust responsibility. 292 By stepping into the war between Maine and the Tribes, the EPA attempted to harmonize the CWA and the Settlement Acts in a manner that protected federal interests and the Tribes' rights. 293 Unfortunately, the EPA's action further divided the Tribes and the State on the issue of water quality regulation on Indian lands. 294 While the current conflict between Maine and the Tribes over water quality regulation is nothing new, it does follow a familiar pattern. 295 More than anything else, this current dispute highlights the fundamental flaws in how Maine and the Tribes interact. The Tribes feel that Maine does not adequately protect their interests in natural
